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Arrangements Made to Replace 25,000 Troops In Battle Zone

Arrangements for U. S. Armed Forces replacements in the Republic of Vietnam by South Vietnamese forces have been made by the Project Vietnamization Task Force at Adm. John S. McCain's headquarters at Camp H. M. Smith in Hawaii.

The action follows President Nixon's decision announced at Midway to replace approximately 25,000 U. S. military personnel in the Republic of Vietnam.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said June 13 he had approved the initial recommendations of the Commander in Chief Pacific, Adm. John S. McCain Jr., and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV.

In a later announcement the Defense Department said approximately 8,000 soldiers, including about 2,000 reservists on active duty, will be returned to the U.S. and their units deactivated.

A total of 7,400 Army troops, including Headquarters, 9th Inf. Div., and the Division's First Brigade, will deploy to Hawaii during July and August.

The 9th Marine Corps Regimental Landing Team totaling 8,000 men of the 3rd Marine Div., will move from the Republic of Vietnam by air and ship in July and August. Destination will be Okinawa. An additional group of about 400 are slated for Japan.

The Project Vietnamization Task Force also reported that some Navy personnel—about 1,200—will be included among those departing the Republic of Vietnam for locations within the Pacific Command and the U. S.

Secretary Laird Responds to Hanoi's POW Reply

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird issued the following statement May 21, 1969, concerning prisoners of war:

Xuan Thuy, chief of the North Vietnam delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, has declared that Hanoi would not promptly release a list of U.S. prisoners of war held in North Vietnam.

I am deeply shocked and disappointed by this cruel response of Hanoi's representative to such a basic request for humanitarian action.

Hundreds of American wives, children and parents continue to live in a tragic state of uncertainty caused by the lack of information concerning the fate of their loved ones. This needless anxiety is caused by the persistent refusal by North Vietnam to release the names of U.S. prisoners of war.

I want to reaffirm the continuing hope that Hanoi will provide a list of American prisoners and permit a free flow of mail between U.S. prisoners of war and their families.

We continue to urge the immediate release of sick and wounded prisoners, the neutral inspection of prisoners of war facilities and the prompt release of all American prisoners.

Soviet Threat To Determine ABM Status

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, told an audience at an Aviation Writers Association conference that the character and number of Soviet offensive weapons could constitute a threat to the United States' strategic forces.

"The phased deployment of SAFEGUARD is intended to give us a minimum necessary 'hedge' to protect against these contingencies," he said.

Reemphasizing the phased deployment aspect of the SAFEGUARD proposal, Dr. Foster said Phase I of the deployment is limited to the location of SAFEGUARD components at two Minutemen wings.

"Deployment of these two sites," he said, "provides an opportunity to 'shake-down' such a system — to find and remove those technical and operational bugs which are not likely to show up in the research and development efforts.

"We will be prepared to move to Phase II, should the threat continue to increase. We could move in the direction of giving greater coverage to the ICBM force, or to protect our alert B-52's or to protect our population against a Communist Chinese ICBM attack, or some combination of these options."

Dr. Foster said that the question of Phase I deployment rests on three key points.

The first point is the matter of incremental funds associated with deployment. "We are requesting just

(Continued on Page 2, Column 1)

Army Is Conducting Tests On New Gas for Aircraft

Preliminary tests using "light water" on gasoline fires at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., have "proved extremely promising," the Army said.

The testing program uses light water, created by adding a six percent preflourinated chemical solution. This permits the foaming water to stay on the surface of a petroleum-fed blaze, effectively smothering the fire.

The water will be the basis of a new system devised by planners of the Medical Service Agency at Fort Sam Houston, a part of the Combat Developments Command, Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Va.

The system, which will be used to suppress and control aircraft crash fires during personnel rescue operations, will be mounted on a light helicopter.

The Army estimates that 25 gallons of light water sprayed from a telescoping or retractable boom will open up a 20 by 40 foot path for rescuers. This could be maintained for up to three minutes in fires with burning spills of 500 gallons of aviation gas or jet fuel.

The hovering helicopter would be able to lower a rescue team while the boom sprays the light water opening up a rescue path. The downwash of the helicopter's rotors would help to suppress the flame during the operation. Either pilot and co-pilot would be able to operate the light water spray system.

The Army has shown an interest in the possible uses of liquefied natural gas to increase aircraft performance, safety and maintenance standards.

Studies at the Combat Developments Command at Fort Belvoir, Va., will determine if "Cryogenic" fuel, with liquid temperatures as low as minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, should replace general purpose (JP) fuel in helicopter gas turbine engines.



BEDSIDE CHAT—Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee talks with Lance Corporal Richard W. Kirk at Charleston Naval Hospital, S. C., during the secretary's recent visit. Kirk was one of a large number of wounded Vietnam returnees. Looking on is Captain D. W. Robinson, hospital commander.

Soviet Threat to Determine ABM Status

(Continued from Page 1, Column 3)

under $900 million in FY 1970 to continue development, test and deployment," he said. "Of this, about half of the money is for development, test and the necessary supervision, and the remainder for deployment."

Secondly, Dr. Foster pointed out, it is important to maintain continuity of this "hedge" against the still evolving threat. He told the writers that the capability to produce and deploy the components of the SAFEGUARD system have been building up since 1967 when Secretary Robert S. McNamara made the decision to proceed with an ABM.

"Without authority for production and deployment, we would have to close our developmental production lines, discharge our production personnel and cease our engineering on sites," he added.

This delay, he said, would "cost two years in the deployment schedule during which time the Soviets, if they continued their present course, could have another hundred SS-9 missiles. This would give the Soviets a total of perhaps 600 missiles with up to 1800 warheads to attack our 1000 Minutemen missiles. This would then be defending with too little, too late."

Dr. Foster's third point, he said, rests on the United States' "desire to negotiate with the Soviet Union and end the strategic nuclear arms race. The President has decided that we should take this minimum step consistent with preserving our security and enhancing the chances for meaningful negotiation with the Soviet Union. Failure to take the step could not only endanger our security in the mid-seventies, but also weaken our negotiation position in the immediate future."

Dr. Foster gave the following example of possible Soviet capability using a system in which the control point could reprogram another missile to make up for failures: "With a missile system having a 20 percent failure rate and carrying three reentry vehicles per missile, they would require only 420 missiles to attack 1000 silos. If the yield of each reentry vehicle was a reasonable five MT and the accuracy a reasonable one-quarter of a mile, about 95 percent of the silos could be destroyed. This would mean 50 of the 1000 Minutemen survive."

Housing Referral Offices Assist Military, Families

More than 43,000 servicemen, or their families, found living quarters in the first three months of 1969 with the help of the 360 Housing Referral Offices at military installations throughout the United States, the Defense Department has reported.

The offices were set up early in 1968 to assist military personnel authorized to live off base, and their families, to locate adequate, economical living quarters quickly and with a minimum loss of time and disruption of family life.

Each of the housing offices offers complete housing referral services and a full range of personal assistance to all military personnel and their families, free from racial discrimination and with equal opportunity and treatment for all military personnel and their dependents, regardless of their pay grade, years of service or marital status.

There is no cost to the serviceman for the referral services. Cost to the government is about $2 for each family or serviceman assisted.

Heart of the referral service is the housing listings maintained by the offices. These come from every conceivable source—realtors, private individuals, other government agencies and anyone who controls housing property. A requirement to list with the office is assurance that no racial discrimination will be practiced against military personnel.

Referrals to housing units in the civilian community are strictly voluntary on the part of the serviceman. Referral offices in no way interfere with the normal relationships between a realtor and his client, serviceman or otherwise.

Complete information on vacant units which meet the requirements of the serviceman are provided him. This includes detailed information regarding transportation facilities, schools, churches, recreational facilities and similar items of interest, along with maps of the area and names of persons to contact.

It is Defense Department policy that there be no discrimination among military personnel because of race, creed, color or national origin. Of the 81,800 servicemen or their families reporting to Housing Referral Offices during the January-March period this year, 62,200 (76 per cent) asked for assistance in finding a place to live. And of these, 43,600 (70 per cent) were housed as a result of Housing Referral Offices. Of this number, there were only 27 alleged instances of discrimination, the Defense Department said. After investigation, 12 of these were found invalid, eight were valid cases which have been settled and seven are under investigation.

The Defense Department said that data available reveal no discernable differences among races in regard to percentages requesting assistance, buying or renting housing units, or remaining without housing two months or more.

The present housing program actually began during the summer of 1967 when the Defense Department launched an intensive campaign to secure open housing for all military personnel in apartment houses with five or more units located near military installations.

At the end of August, 1967, at least 245,600 living units (about 22 per cent) were open on an equal basis to all military personnel. As of April, 1969, 1,307,900 units were open, about 95 per cent. Cooperation by apartment house owners or operators has made a substantial contribution to the success of the Housing Referral Program.

Originally located only at installations with 500 or more military personnel assigned, the offices were expanded this year to extend these services to all military personnel stationed in the U.S. Of 360 Housing Referral Offices, the Army has 114, the Navy 61, Marine Corps 14, Air Force 170 and the Defense Atomic Support Agency 1.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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UNIQUE REUNION—Three general officers who served together as personnel chiefs for their Services during the mid-Sixties met once again during SHAPEX 69 at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium. Now working together in new roles related to the NATO military alliance are (left to right) Gen. Horace M. Wade, USAF, SHAPE's Chief of Staff; VAdm. Benedict J. Semmes, USN, Commander Strike Fleet Atlantic, Norfolk, Va., and Gen. James K. Woolnough, USA, Commanding General of U. S. Continental Army Command, Ft. Monroe, Va.

Secretary of Defense Testifies

U.S. Foreign Policy and the ABM

On May 22, at a special hearing on the Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System held by the House Appropriations Committee's subcommittees on the Department of Defense and Military Construction, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird presented a classified statement which he described as "perhaps the most complete that has ever been put together on the Safeguard system."

An unclassified version of the hearings was released on June 10. Here are excerpts from Secretary Laird's testimony on foreign policy aspects of the Safeguard program.

For many years, and over several administrations, this Nation's strategic nuclear war policies have been squarely based on the proposition that the other great nuclear power in the world, the Soviet Union, must under all foreseeable conditions be deterred from ever attempting a first strike on the United States.

The terminology employed in describing this policy has varied over the years, but its essence has remained unchanged: we must always be in a position where we can inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, even after absorbing the first blow.

"Assured Destruction" Through 1970s

The issue that now confronts the Nation is how best to ensure that deterrent (or "Assured Destruction") power through the 1970s. If the Soviets continue on the course they are now following, and I am speaking here of what they are actually doing and not what we think they intend to do, the survival of two of the three major elements of our strategic offensive forces, namely, the bombers and the land-based ICBMs, could be gravely endangered.

To rely on only one of the three major elements would, in my considered judgment, be far too risky, considering the stake involved, which is the very survival of our Nation. It is perfectly apparent, therefore, that something more must be done, and in view of the lead times involved, done fairly soon.

One possibility, of course, is an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic armaments. I wholeheartedly support that objective, and we should do everything in our power to achieve a suitable agreement. But we must recognize that the issues involved are extremely complex and, even with the best of good will on both sides, it will be very difficult to work out an arrangement which truly safeguards the security of our respective nations.

Meanwhile, we have to deal with the world as it is today. Until an acceptable arrangement is achieved, we must continue to ensure the sufficiency of our deterrent.

We can do this by increasing our strategic offensive forces. But we feel that this course would simply accelerate the arms race with the Soviet Union. And it would not solve the problem of the other threat looming on the horizon: namely, the prospect that the Chinese Communists will deploy an ICBM force. Nor would it provide protection against the possibility of an accidental ICBM launch against the United States, or an intimidation attack with a few missiles.

The only single program which can cope with all of these contingencies is Safeguard.

While there might be some question as to whether it would be worth $10 billion to place ourselves in a position to defend against any one of these potential threats, there can be no question but that it would be well worth that amount of money to be able to defend ourselves against all of these threats.

US-Soviet Arms Talks

We see no reason why a decision to move forward with Phase 1 of the Safeguard program should in any way impede the forthcoming talks with the Soviet Union on strategic armaments limitation. Let me remind you that only a few days after the Senate had approved the Sentinel program last year, following many dire warnings that such an approval would wreck the chances for strategic arms talks, the Soviets announced their readiness to start such talks. And they have displayed no loss of interest in the ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Furthermore, as I noted earlier, the Soviet Union has been deploying an ABM system around Moscow, and they are continuing their work on more advanced ABMs. I think it is entirely possible, therefore, that the Soviet Union may want to provide for some minimum ABM defense in any agreement they reach with us on the limitation of strategic armaments. The Soviet leaders have traditionally laid great stress on defense, particularly the defense of Moscow, and I doubt very much that they would be willing to dismantle the existing Galosh ABM system around that city.

Thus, it is entirely possible that a Soviet-U.S. agreement on strategic arms limitations might provide for a limited ABM defense on both sides. I myself can see no objection to such an arrangement, especially in the face of a situa-

tion where our cities could become hostage to the Chinese Communists.

I recognize that we plan to continue to rely on our deterrent to protect our cities against a Soviet attack in the 1970s, but that is because we have no better alternative. Against the Chinese Communist ICBM threat, however, we do have a better alternative, and that is the deployment of the Safeguard system. I think we would be foolhardy not to employ it, if that threat does indeed begin to emerge.

Chinese Nuclear Blackmail

With regard to other foreign policy implications of a decision to deploy Safeguard, we believe that "on balance" the advantages far exceed the disadvantages. This would be particularly true with respect to the free world position in Asia.

Once Communist China acquires a force of medium range bombers and/or ballistic missiles, all of her neighbors would be open to nuclear blackmail. Should Communist China then also acquire an ICBM force with which it can threaten our cities, and we have no defense against it, the President of the United States would have no alternative but to back down or risk the destruction of several of our major cities in any serious confrontation with Communist China.

Furthermore, as former Secretary of Defense McNamara pointed out last year in his discussion of the Sentinel program, "It would provide an additional indication to the people of Asia that we intend to support them against nuclear blackmail from China, and thus help to convince

'We must always be in a position where we can inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, even after absorbing the first blow.'

the non-nuclear countries that acquisition of their own nuclear weapons is not required for their security."

Attitude of Western Europe

The issue of an ABM defense for Western Europe was discussed with our allies and it was concluded that the threat was so great and varied that even an extensive deployment might not be able to prevent great damage from the kind of attack the Soviets could mount over the next several years.

However, some of our NATO allies have expressed concern about the impact of such a decision on the prospects for a detente in Europe. But, as I just pointed out, the decision of the U.S. Congress last year to support the the Sentinel program did not have any perceptible adverse effect on the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Non-proliferation Treaty or the strategic arms limitation talks. I doubt that a decision to proceed with Safeguard will have any bearing on their attitude toward a detente in Europe.

Threat to Both U.S. and USSR

Further, abandonment of ballistic missile defense may be imprudent for both the Soviets and ourselves. Previously, the Soviets' ABM deployment was aimed only at the United States. Today, our intelligence suggests they may be directing their defenses also toward Communist China.

It would appear that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat. So the

'The Safeguard system will work. I am convinced it will work. I am convinced it is necessary.'

abandonment of the entire system, particularly as long as the Chinese threat is there, probably would not be looked upon with much favor by either country.

I believe they [the Chinese Communists] have the capabilities to go forward with tests on an ICBM within the next 16 to 18 months.

I think . . . that by the latter part of the decade of the 1970s the Chinese can have the capability of destroying tens of millions of people here in the U.S. with a force of less than 100 ICBMs. I am not sure of the rationale of the Chinese—how they would use this force. I won't try to read their intentions, but they certainly could attempt to use this force to deter us from making good on our commitments to various countries in that part of the world which they may threaten.

I think it is quite possible if we get into arms limitation talks [with the USSR], that this could be a mutually agreed point between the two countries: that we both go forward with protection against possible Chinese threats.

This Safeguard system will work. I am convinced it will work. I am convinced it is necessary.

It is the clear responsibility of the President and the

'We intend to support them (the people of Asia) against nuclear blackmail from China.'

Secretary of Defense . . . to follow the course which, in our best judgment, is in the best interests of the national security of the United States. Our decision on Safeguard was an attempt to do that.

Defense Comptroller Discusses Management Control Process

Management control within the Department of Defense "is like other organizations, but multiplied by several orders of magnitude," according to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert C. Moot.

Speaking before the Control Club of Harvard Business School at Boston, Mr. Moot said the Defense Department's assets are "greater than the combined assets of the one hundred largest United States industrial companies," and, "It consumes annually over nine per cent of the gross national product of the United States."

He noted that these and other characteristics of DOD management control produce a rather interesting set of problems. "Now how do we go about chipping away at the problem?" Secretary Moot asked.

In explaining, he said it was useful to classify our control process into three major areas of defense activity: resource allocation, weapons acquisition and defense operation.

He said the defense resource allocation process has evolved steadily since 1947. As it looks today, he noted, "We have the advantage of beginning with a commonly understood baseline, the Five Year Defense Program which records Secretary of Defense decisions on forces, funds and manpower."

Changes in this program proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff based on an up-to-date review of intelligence data are codified in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. It is analyzed and evaluated for the Secretary of Defense by his staff and these evaluations result in the publication of policy and planning memoranda each dealing with a definitive area or function.

After being analyzed and debated among the Office of the Secretary, the military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Program Change Requests are reviewed and when approved are incorporated into the Five Year Defense Program.

"The approved program as of August 31 is the baseline for the budget submission which occurs one month later," Mr. Moot said.

"As you can see, the process is

SECRETARY MOOT

highly repetitive. It is this way deliberately," Secretary Moot said. "When dealing in terms of billions of dollars and crucial questions of national security it is simply not feasible to shut off debate.

"A technological breakthrough occurring midway in the cycle can make a prior decision completely obsolete; so can a change in the international balance of power or in the economy. The process must remain dynamic."

Secretary Moot noted that the weapons acquisition process moves down this pipeline with its control gates to manage progress from idea to deployed hardware. "A weapon system may have its genesis in operational need, in a technological breakthrough or in the interaction of the two. The technical uncertainties which beset this multi-year cycle form the primary problem in the development of an adequate management control system."

He mentioned that in the past few years significant changes have been made in the acquisition process. He said first with the objective of procuring the most cost effective system, a Concept Formulation Phase was established. "In this phase, tradeoffs of system performance versus cost are made and definitions of major areas of technical uncertainty are developed."

He said if a systems idea passes a tough array of hurdles — operational, technical, economic, political — it moves into a period of engineering or operational systems development called contract definition. This phase is intended to provide an opportunity for the competitive development of adequate technical baseline information for the purpose of contracting for the systems.

He noted that in past years this has generally meant a paperwork exercise, but the trend today is turning more toward prototype development. At the end of contract definition it is decided whether to go forward into full-scale development and who will do the job. "When development has progressed sufficiently, a decision is subsequently made on production and deployment."

He said finally there is the process of operations management. "After resources have been allocated, after weapons have been acquired, there are the mammoth problems of operating the Department of Defense."

He brought up Project PRIME which he noted "was undoubtedly the most ambitious management control system ever designed and implemented.

"It introduced a common account structure which tied back to the plan and gave the Department the capability of measuring by organization, function, and resource element. It established an accrual system and simultaneously moved all consumable resources — labor, material and service — into categories where their costs could be accrued.

"Thus, for the first time, the Department has the potential of measuring resources consumed against work done at almost any level.

"This, of course, is constrained by our continuing problem with the development of sound output measures. It focused the attention of managers on the totality of their resources and demanded that they become concerned with segments, such as military labor, which previously had been in a financial sense, outright grants for which they had little responsibility."

Mr. Moot said we have much work to do to perfect this system. "Perhaps our greatest problem is still one of education and motivation. But there are signs of growing understanding and acceptance.

Uniform Food Service Program Is Taking Shape

The uniform Department of Defense Food Service Program is slowly taking shape as a result of a series of actions by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) on the basis of a January 1966 Logistics Management Institute study on food rations and food service management.

First action was to establish a Directorate for Food Service at the Secretary level. This directorate reports to Mr. Paul H. Riley, deputy assistant secretary for supply and services. It is the focal point for all DOD policy matters relating to the subsisting of enlisted personnel of all military departments.

A subsequent action, and the one that most affects military commanders and the subsisting of their personnel was an equalization of the food allowance for all military departments. This change was accomplished by Presidential delegation to the Secretary of Defense authorizing him to prescribe the Army and Air Force food allowance. Accordingly, its effect was principally applicable to the Army and Air Force in that the food allowance was equated by the Secretary of Defense to that of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Capt. James A. Warren, SC, USN, the director since the directorate's inception in July 1966, said that the standardizing of the food allowance was a prerequisite to follow-on action for carrying out OSD's policy of standardizing functions common to all military services.

The net result of standardization of the food service program is designed to establish a minimum standard of feeding for enlisted personnel service-wide. Although economies are not anticipated in food costs, they are expected as a result of consolidation and centralization of the food service facilities.

Systems management of the food service program is the objective of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L). The military departments have the responsibility for developing actions necessary to achieve system management of the food service program. A principal element of that planning is accomplished by the DOD Food Planning Board. Currently an armed forces recipe service as developed by a committee of that board is being distributed for world-wide military use.

This is being followed by development of a menu guide that may be used by all services to replace the age-old monthly prepared Army/Air Force master menu; the Navy's three-week menu guide; and the Marine Corps' 30-day cyclic menu that will provide a wider variety of food items and one that will reflect the desires of the customers to the maximum extent possible.

Of interest is the fact that such a cyclic menu was recently adopted by the Army/Air Force Exchange Cafeteria Systems. The objective of the cyclic menu is to provide a basic and broad procurement document for the seasonal procurement of non-perishable food commodities, but equally important, it is to provide the minimum standards from which to springboard an improved food service program.

Running parallel to the purely food preparation and service facet, and responsible for an area with the greatest potential of hard dollar economies, is the DOD Food Service Facility and Equipment Planning Board. The board consists of experts in this field from each of the military services and the Defense Supply Agency. An objective of the board, among others, is to provide assistance to the military departments in preparing and justifying a long-range program for construction of efficient, modern-day food service facilities with the associated equipment.

Equally significant to facilities and equipment and even more personally important to personnel in the food service field is a program for improving their career field. Only the Marine Corps has found a career program for food service personnel that offers promotional incentives to those who excel.

In this regard the military departments are currently drafting a proposed uniform training program. Subsequently, the departments will be requested to develop a career field program for food service personnel that will recognize these talents and provide promotional attention.

To establish policy pertaining to food allowances, and principally to determine the rate of expenditure of the $1 billion cost for military personnel foods, a DOD reporting instruction is being readied for early release.

For a long-range plan, the Army in coordination with the other military services has been named to develop a five-year research and development program to include necessary funding for modernization in feeding military personnel. This program is being proposed to begin with the Fiscal Year 1971 budget cycle.

Armed Forces Show Increase

Numerical strength of the Armed Forces went up 12,566 during April based on preliminary reports.

The Department of Defense said strength of the Armed Forces on April 30 was 3,464,465.

The figures for the different services are:

	Apr. 30 1969	Mar. 31 1969	Apr. 30 1968
Total DOD	3,464,465	3,451,899	3,493,737
Army	1,514,412	1,508,307	1,532,541
Navy	766,971	760,801	758,758
Marine Corps	313,419	314,917	300,816
Air Force	869,663	867,874	901,622

President Signs July 1 Pay Raise for Military Personnel

OFFICERS

Pay grade	2 or less	Over 2	Over 3	Over 4	Over 6	Over 8	Over 10	Over 12	Over 14	Over 16	Over 18	Over 20	Over 22	Over 26	Over 30
0-10[1]	$1810.20	$1874.10	$1874.10	$1874.10	$1874.10	$1945.80	$1945.80	$2094.90	$2094.90	$2244.90	$2244.90	$2394.60	$2394.60	$2544.30	$2544.30
0-9	1604.40	1646.40	1681.80	1681.80	1681.80	1724.10	1724.10	1795.80	1795.80	1945.80	1945.80	2094.90	2094.90	2244.90	2244.90
0-8	1453.20	1496.70	1532.40	1532.40	1532.40	1646.40	1646.40	1724.10	1724.10	1795.80	1874.10	1945.80	2024.10	2024.10	2024.10
0-7	1207.20	1289.70	1289.70	1289.70	1347.00	1347.00	1425.30	1425.30	1496.70	1646.40	1759.80	1759.80	1759.80	1759.80	1759.80
0-6	894.60	983.40	1047.60	1047.60	1047.60	1047.60	1047.60	1047.60	1083.30	1254.30	1318.50	1347.00	1425.30	1546.20	1546.20
0-5	715.50	840.90	898.20	898.20	898.20	898.20	926.10	975.60	1040.70	1118.70	1182.90	1218.30	1261.20	1261.20	1261.20
0-4	603.60	734.40	783.90	783.90	798.00	833.70	890.48	940.50	983.40	1026.30	1054.80	1054.80	1054.80	1054.80	1054.80
0-3[2]	561.00	627.00	669.60	741.60	776.70	804.90	848.10	890.40	912.00	912.00	912.00	912.00	912.00	912.00	912.00
0-2[2]	449.70	534.00	641.40	662.70	676.50	676.50	676.50	676.50	676.50	676.50	676.50	676.50	676.50	676.50	676.50
0-1[2]	386.40	427.80	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00	534.00

[1]While serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or Commandant of the Marine Corps, basic pay for this grade is $2,807.10 regardless of cumulative years of service.

[2]Does not apply to commissioned officers who have been credited with over 4 years' active service as enlisted members.

OFFICERS CREDITED WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS ENLISTED MEMBERS

Pay grade	Over 4	Over 6	Over 8	Over 10	Over 12	Over 14	Over 16	Over 18	Over 20	Over 22	Over 26	Over 30
0-3	$741.60	$776.70	$804.90	$848.10	$890.40	$926.10	$926.10	$926.10	$926.10	$926.10	$926.10	$926.10
0-2	662.70	676.50	698.10	734.40	762.90	783.90	783.90	783.90	783.90	783.90	783.90	783.90
0-1	534.00	570.30	591.60	612.90	634.20	662.70	662.70	662.70	662.70	662.70	662.70	662.70

WARRANT OFFICERS

Pay grade	2 or less	Over 2	Over 3	Over 4	Over 6	Over 8	Over 10	Over 12	Over 14	Over 16	Over 18	Over 20	Over 22	Over 26	Over 30
W-4	$571.20	$612.90	$612.90	$627.00	$655.20	$684.00	$712.50	$762.90	$798.00	$826.50	$848.10	$876.30	$905.40	$975.60	$975.60
W-3	519.30	563.30	563.40	570.30	577.20	619.50	655.20	676.50	698.10	719.10	741.60	769.80	798.00	826.50	826.50
W-2	454.80	491.70	491.70	506.10	534.00	563.40	584.70	605.70	627.00	648.60	669.60	690.90	719.10	719.10	719.10
W-1	378.90	434.70	434.70	470.70	491.70	513.00	534.00	555.90	577.20	598.50	619.50	641.40	641.40	641.40	641.40

ENLISTED MEMBERS

Pay grade	2 or less	Over 2	Over 3	Over 4	Over 6	Over 8	Over 10	Over 12	Over 14	Over 16	Over 18	Over 20	Over 22	Over 26	Over 30
E-9[1]							$648.90	$663.90	$679.20	$694.20	$709.50	$723.60	$761.70	$835.80	$835.80
E-8							559.80	574.50	589.80	604.80	619.20	634.50	672.00	746.40	746.40
E-7	$342.30	$410.10	$425.40	$440.40	$455.40	$544.50	469.80	484.80	500.40	522.60	537.30	552.30	559.80	597.30	672.00
E-6	294.90	358.20	372.90	388.20	403.20	469.80	417.90	433.20	455.40	469.80	484.80	492.60	492.60	492.60	492.60
E-5	254.70	313.80	328.80	343.20	365.70	380.70	395.70	410.10	417.60	417.90	417.90	417.90	417.90	417.90	417.90
E-4	214.20	268.50	283.50	305.70	321.00	321.00	321.00	321.00	321.00	321.00	321.00	321.00	321.00	321.00	321.00
E-3	155.10	216.30	231.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30	246.30
E-2	127.80	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10	179.10
E-1	123.30	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80	163.80
E-1 (under 4 months)	115.20														

[1]While serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or Commandant of the Marine Corps, basic pay

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